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Supply and Demand, One and the Same Since 
When?: The EPA’s Failed Attempt to Find a 
Loophole in the Renewable Fuel Standard
“We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if 
humanity is to survive.”1
INTRODUCTION
Since Congress’s promulgation of the Clean Air Act in 1963,2 the 
United States government has attempted to focus domestic consumers on 
reducing the amount of pollution they contribute to the environment. 
Moreover, in two amendments to the Clean Air Act—one in 2005 and 
another in 2007—Congress promulgated and expanded the Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS) program, authorizing the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to mandate an annually 
increasing production of renewable fuels.3 As consumers use what is 
provided, the production and availability of fuels that generate less carbon 
dioxide when burned is critical to the overall goal of reducing pollution. 
The consumption of renewable fuels reduces carbon dioxide emissions, 
which slows the rise of global temperatures.4 Thus, the closer producers 
get to yielding a transportation fuel composed of 100% renewable fuel, the 
closer consumers will be to achieving the goal of the Clean Air Act and 
RFS—reducing pollution.
Though the RFS appears theoretically sound, its implementation has 
proven difficult. Until 2013, the problem rested with renewable fuel 
producers, who were unable to generate the mandated supply. Today’s 
problem, however, lies with the retailers and advertisers. Fuel retailers, 
commanded by large oil companies that have dominated the fuel market 
for decades, claim that practical and infrastructural constraints, known as 
Copyright 2017, by KOURTNEY LANEA KECH
1. Robert Shogan, Mankind’s Challenge: Living with Terror: The Bomb is 40,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1985, articles.latimes.com/1985-08-04/news/mn-4275_1_atomic
-bomb [https://perma.cc/VV3K-EP9Z] (quoting Albert Einstein).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–661 (2015).
3. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C.); Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–40, §§ 201–04, 121 Stat. 
1492 (2007).
4. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma
.cc/M67G-VPSX] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
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the “blendwall,” deem the RFS required amounts unattainable.5 The EPA 
appears sympathetic to this notion, and as a result, it has lowered the 
statutory volumes of renewable fuel to meet consumption and distribution 
constraints.6 However, it is unclear whether the EPA has the power to do 
so. The EPA’s recent actions, especially those since 2013, have 
undermined the goals and requirements of the RFS, undercut investment 
in advanced biofuels, and raised greenhouse gas emissions in the 
transportation fuel sector.7 Renewable fuels required to be used by the RFS 
statute “reduce emissions of greenhouse gases compared to fossil fuels,” 
so the EPA’s reduction in renewable fuel volumes subject to the RFS has 
a direct and damaging impact on greenhouse gas emissions goals.8
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief overview of renewable 
fuels, noting key differences in the nature and uses of first-generation 
biofuels. Part II addresses the history and recent popularization of ethanol, 
a first-generation biofuel that provides a fuel source arguably more eco-
friendly than more traditional sources such as petroleum. Part III describes 
the RFS, tracing its evolution from its origins in 2005 to the current law in 
effect. It will also discuss the relevant statutory provisions that the EPA 
relied on when reducing the statutory volumes of renewable fuel for 2014–
2016. Part IV provides an overview of the EPA’s interpretation of its 
statutory authority and claim that it has the power to consider the 
blendwall constraints when determining whether there is an “inadequate 
domestic supply” of renewable fuels. Finally, Part V of this Comment 
provides the framework for judicial review of agency interpretations of 
statutes and will include an analysis, using two landmark cases involving 
agency interpretation, to determine whether the EPA has overstepped the 
constitutional bounds of its authority with its broad interpretation of the 
RFS waiver provision.
                                                                                                            
5. See Marc J. Rauch, Big Oil’s Anti-E15 Campaign Filled with Gross 
Exaggerations and Misinformation, AUTO CHANNEL (May 16, 2012), theautochannel
.com/news/2012/05/16/036507-big-oil-s-anti-e15-campaign-filed-with-gross-
exaggerations.html [https://perma.cc/MU9E-S4VA].
6. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Biomass-
Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420 (Dec. 14, 2015).
7. Letter from Brent Erickson, Exec. Vice President, Biotechnology Indus. 
Org., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA, 1–2 (July 27, 2015), bio.org/sites/default/files
/EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0111%20-%20BIO%202014-2016%20RFS%20Comments
%20-%202015-07-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2C-XJU9] (referencing Docket No. 
EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0111).
8. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Modifications to Renewable 
Fuel Standard Program, 78. Fed. Reg. 62462, 62465 (Oct. 22, 2013); see also id. at 
62468 (noting that Clean Air Aft section 211(o) “requires all renewable fuels used in 
the RFS program . . . to meet specified thresholds for reductions in lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions compared to a baseline fossil fuel”).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF BIOFUELS
As the RFS contains vocabulary new to those unfamiliar with 
scientific study, it is important to define key terms detailed in the 
legislation before discussing its ramifications. Thus, familiarization with 
biofuel—the topic Congress attempts to legislatively control in the RFS—
will create the foundation necessary to understand the potential conflicts 
that the current statutory language permits.
While the U.S. has historically relied on petroleum to satisfy the 
majority of its energy needs, the consequences of that reliance have proven 
grave. Among other things, the exploration for and production of 
petroleum releases dangerous toxins into the atmosphere, contributes to 
greenhouse gas emissions, and often involves consequential oil spills, 
which cause great environmental damage.9 In an effort to reduce U.S. 
reliance on such an environmentally unfriendly resource, car 
manufacturers and utility companies have been in serious pursuit of 
alternative energy sources. Among the leading contenders are biofuels—
the renewable, clean burning fuels that Congress addresses in the RFS.
“Biofuel” denotes any fuel produced from renewable biomass, which 
includes plants, woody materials, and organic wastes.10 Plants take in 
carbon dioxide as they grow and, theoretically, emit the same amount of 
carbon dioxide when burned as fuel.11 While some observers consider 
biofuels to be “carbon neutral,”12 others argue that the use of fossil fuels 
needed to produce the sources of biofuel effectively create higher carbon 
dioxide emissions than can be balanced out by the burning of those 
biofuels.13 Nevertheless, they contribute far less carbon than the 
production of petroleum. Transportation biofuels, which are those used in 
motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, non-road vehicles, or non-road 
engines (except for ocean-going vessels),14 are commonly classified as 
first-, second-, or third-generation biofuels.15 The different generation 
9. See generally Wout Broekema, Crisis-Induced Learning and Issue
Politicization in the EU: The Braer, Sea Empress, Erika, and Prestige Oil Spill 
Disasters, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: SYMPOSIUM: DESIGNING RESILIENT 
INSTITUTIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT 381 (Arjen Boin & 
Martin Lodge ed., 2016).
10. Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard
Eventually End Corn Ethanol’s Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 667 (2010). The 
biofuel definition explicitly excludes fossil fuels.
11. Cymie Payne, Local Meets Global: The Low Carbon Fuel Standard and
the WTO, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG 891, 895 (2009).
12. Powers, supra note 10, at 669.
13. See id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (o)(1)(L) (2015).
15. See Powers, supra note 10, at 667.
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designations depend on the sources used to derive these fuels, their current 
or future commercial availability, their overall energy efficiency, and the 
potential side effects of their production and use.16
A. First-Generation Biofuels
Although the definition of first-generation biofuel is not scientifically 
established, the term generally refers to biofuels that are currently 
produced on a commercial scale.17 As first-generation biofuels are 
extracted from plants that typically serve as crops or feedstocks,18 they can 
be derived using relatively simple technology and can be produced in 
massive quantities at a lower production cost.19 Ethanol and biodiesel—
both serving as replacements for transportation fuel—are the two main 
categories of first-generation biofuel.20 This Comment will focus solely on 
ethanol because the EPA has chosen to waive the total renewable fuel 
requirement, which has historically been composed of ethanol.
B. Second- and Third-Generation Biofuels
Second-generation biofuels are those that are close to approaching 
commercial scale production status and include fuels produced from non-
food, cellulosic materials rather than from feedstocks.21 It is more difficult 
to mass-produce these biofuels due to challenges in releasing the sugars 
from these materials necessary to convert them to ethanol.22
Third-generation biofuels include several experimental alcohols 
developed from crops and the promising—and proven—technology of 
algae-based biodiesels (oilgae).23 These biofuels are not yet available due 
to lack of production experience—algae growth requires extensive 
amounts of water, nitrogen, and phosphorous that makes it more costly to 
produce.24 Large-scale oilgae production is unlikely to occur in the near 
16. Id.
17. Timothy A. Slating & Jay P. Kesan, The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?
Moving Forward With the Federal Biofuel Mandate, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 374, 386 
(2014).
18. Id. at 388.
19. Id.
20. Powers, supra note 10, at 675.
21. Anselm Eisentraut, Sustainable Production of Second-Generation Biofuels:
Potential and Perspectives in Major Economies and Developing Countries, INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY 1, 80 (2010).
22. Id.
23. Powers, supra note 10, at 676.
24. Id.
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future because companies with enough capital to invest in the process are 
hesitant to face the high production costs.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHANOL
The vast majority of ethanol, or ethyl alcohol, is derived from starch- and 
sugar-based feedstocks.25 The use of these food materials, easy to extract and 
ferment, makes large-scale ethanol production affordable.26 Corn serves as the 
feedstock for most domestic ethanol production and is currently the leading 
crop in the U.S. As concerns surrounding corn’s availability for human and 
livestock have risen, the RFS has limited the amount of starch-based ethanol 
permitted to satisfy the statutory volume of 15 billion gallons.27 This 
limitation is in place to ensure that enough corn remains to meet demand in 
livestock feed, human food, and export markets.28
A. Background and History
Despite ethanol’s recent popularization, it is not a new engine fuel. It 
has been used since the 1820s, when Samuel Morey introduced its use in 
his first internal combustion engine prototype.29 Ethanol fuel then received 
little attention until 1860, when Nicholas Otto began experimenting with 
internal combustion engines.30 Later, in 1896, Henry Ford designed his 
first car, the “Quadricycle,” to run on pure ethanol.31 In 1908, Ford’s 
revolutionary “Model T” was capable of running on gasoline, ethanol, or 
a combination of both.32 While Ford continued to advocate for ethanol fuel 
during the prohibition movement, lower prices caused gasoline to prevail.
                                                                                                            
25. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Alternative Fuels Data Center: Ethanol Production 
and Distribution, afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_production.html [https://perma.cc
/LR3A-3FHE] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Alternative Fuels Data Center: Ethanol Feedstocks,
afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_feedstocks.html [https://perma.cc/8PDT-F3WH] (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017).
27. Id.
28. See Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the 
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,466–67 (Dec. 14, 
2015); Brent D. Yacobucci, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42824, ANALYSIS OF 
RENEWABLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS (RINS) IN THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD 
(RFS) 1 (2013).
29. See HORST O. HARDENBERG, SAMUEL MOREY AND HIS ATMOSPHERIC 
ENGINE (1992). His discovery was overlooked, mostly due to the success of steam 
power at the time.
30. See LYLE CUMMINS, INTERNAL FIRE: THE INTERNAL COMBUSTION 
ENGINE 1673–1900 (1989).
31. See Henry Ford, HISTORY.COM, history.com/topics/henry-ford [https:
//perma.cc/QF39-7MS8] (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
32. Id.
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In the late 1970s, the U.S. saw long-term growth in gasoline containing 
up to 10% ethanol (E10).33 The discovery that methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(MTBE) was contaminating groundwater spurred the demand for ethanol 
produced from field corn, thus opening a new market for ethanol.34
The steep growth in twenty-first century ethanol use was driven by 
federal legislation aimed to reduce oil use and enhance energy security. As 
discussed below, Congress sought, through promulgation of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 (EISA), and the RFS arising from each, to significantly reduce 
reliance on foreign fuel sources and to reduce greenhouse gases.
B. Ethanol’s Rise in Popularity
As rule makers promulgated legislation to counter the negative 
environmental impacts of diesel gasoline, biofuels, including ethanol, 
grew increasingly popular. More than 97% of today’s biofuel comes in the 
form of ethanol.35 Ethanol-blended fuel is typically E10 (90% gasoline, 
10% ethanol), which is the blend approved for use by every major 
automaker in the world.36 Today, nearly all of the approximately 139 
billion gallons of gasoline used for transportation purposes contains 10% 
ethanol.37 To illustrate, when consumers go to gas stations to fill up their 
tanks, they can normally look on the pump and find a sign containing 
language similar to “contains 10% ethanol.” This sign effectively alerts 
the consumer that he or she will be putting E10 gasoline into the vehicle.
In addition to E10, the EPA works with auto manufacturers to qualify 
cars for higher blend levels—most notably, E15 (contains 15% ethanol) 
and E85 (contains 85% ethanol). While E85 contains the least amount of 
diesel fuel (15%), the only vehicles able to efficiently burn this fuel are 
flex-fuel vehicles, which have not gained enough popularity to dominate 
the automobile market.38 In addition, though some car models from 2001 
and later have been approved for E15, the warranties of many automakers 
                                                                                                            
33. Jeffrey Goettemoeller & Adrian Goettemoeller, SUSTAINABLE ETHANOL:
BIOFUELS, BIOREFINERIES, CELLULOSIC BIOMASS, FLEX-FUEL VEHICLES, AND 
SUSTAINABLE FARMING FOR ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 42 (2007).
34. Id.
35. RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, POCKET GUIDE TO ETHANOL 2015, 1, 2 
(2015). As discussed above, corn-based ethanol is considered a first-generation 
biofuel. As such, ethanol is a biodegradable, high-octane motor fuel derived from 
the sugars, starches, and cellulosic matter found in plants.
36. Rauch, supra note 5, at 1.
37. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Biomass-
Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,421 (Dec. 14, 2015).
38. Id. at 77,438.
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do not cover the use of E15 fuel.39 As a result, the fuel market is dominated 
by E0 (100% gasoline) and E10.40
III. THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD
In the mid-2000s, growing concerns over energy security, greenhouse 
gas emissions, and steep oil prices combined to reinvigorate consumer, 
governmental, and commercial support for new biofuels.41 To address 
these concerns, Congress promulgated the RFS, a statutory mandate that 
requires domestic transportation fuel to contain a specified, minimum 
volume of biofuel.42 The RFS has played a dominant role in the continued 
development of the United States biofuel sector; however, the standards 
that the EPA released for 2014 through 2016 reflect a novel and 
questionable interpretation of the statutory language. This Comment 
presents the evolution of the original RFS to the law in effect today and 
highlights sections on which the legislative authority relied when setting 
the 2014–2016 standards.
A. Evolution of the Renewable Fuel Standard
In order to ascertain the legislature’s intent when enacting law, it is 
imperative to understand the circumstances under which the law was 
created. This Comment thus provides a brief description of RFS1, the prior 
version of the RFS, and RFS2, the current law in effect.
1. Origins and RFS1
Congress passed the EPAct in response to increasing national demand 
for transportation fuel, declining domestic production of refined petroleum 
products, and rising environmental concerns associated with rapid and 
negative climate change.43 As part of a larger program to encourage 
development of renewable fuels, the EPAct amended the fuel provisions 
of the Clean Air Act44 to establish the RFS, set forth at section 211o of the 
                                                                                                            
39. Rauch, supra note 5, at 1.
40. Michael Romita, The Renewable Fuel Program at an Inflection Point: 
Policy Implication of EPA’s Proposed 2014-2016 Renewable Fuel Standard, 45
ENVTL. L. 10674, 10674 (2015).
41. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1224, 119 Stat. 
594, 954 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 
U.S.C.).
42. Id.
43. Romita, supra note 40, at 10675.
44. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2009).
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Clean Air Act.45 The original RFS, commonly known as RFS1, authorized 
the EPA to establish a comprehensive program to replace traditional diesel 
gasoline with increasing annual volumes of renewable fuel.46
Under RFS1, Congress required the EPA to determine and publish 
annual percentage standards for each compliance year.47 Obligated 
parties—generally producers and importers of gasoline and diesel fuel—
were to use these percentage standards to calculate their individual 
compliance obligations.48 There are four percentage standards, each of 
which is applied to the volume of non-renewable gasoline and diesel 
produced or imported by each obligated party during a given year.49 The 
application of the percentage standard serves to determine the individual 
volume obligation with respect to each of the renewable fuel types—
advanced biofuel, biomass-based diesel, cellulosic biofuel, and 
conventional biofuel.50 Renewable Identification Numbers (RINS) are 
assigned by renewable fuel producers to each gallon of qualifying 
renewable fuel and serve as a means for demonstrating compliance by 
obligated parties.51 Aside from using sufficient current-year RINS to 
demonstrate compliance in a given year, obligated parties may also choose 
one of two options: to use available RINS from the prior year towards the 
current year’s requirement, for up to a 20% cap, or to carry forward a 
deficit into the next compliance year.52
Prior to promulgation of RFS1, the U.S. had produced a total of only 
3.9 billion gallons of ethanol.53 The high production cost of advanced 
ethanol appeared to thwart further production; thus, absent government 
interjection, fuel ethanol production was projected to plateau. To 
overcome production barriers, RFS1 mandated an increased use of 
renewable fuel to 4.0 billion gallons in 2006, increasing yearly production 
to 7.5 billions in 2012.54
2. The Current Law–RFS2
In the wake of rising oil prices, Congress promulgated EISA as a 
comprehensive bill designed to increase energy efficiency and the 
45. Id. § 7545(o).
46. Id.
47. See id. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i).
48. Id. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(ii).
49. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i).
50. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
51. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii).
52. Id. § 7545(o)(2).
53. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, §§
201–04, 121 Stat. 1492, 1519-30 (2007).
54. See § 7545(o)(2)(B).
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availability of renewable energy.55 Known as RFS2, this act significantly 
expanded RFS1, extending by ten years the compliance period in which 
Congress specified the required volume of renewable fuels—now through 
2022.56 Congress also increased the yearly-required volumes57 and added 
new, categorized mandates to begin in 2009.58 The categorized mandates, 
nested within the total renewable fuel mandate, were separated into four 
types: cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel, and total 
(conventional) renewable fuel.59
B. Key RFS Provisions—Waivers
RFS2 places three waiver provisions at the EPA’s disposal: a 
cellulosic biofuel waiver, a biomass-based diesel waiver, and a general 
waiver.60 The legislation dictates that if a waiver is issued in favor of a 
producer, it automatically expires after one year unless extended by the 
EPA Administrator.61
1. The Cellulosic Biofuel Waiver
The EPA must annually determine the projected volume of cellulosic 
biofuel production for the following year.62 If the projected volume is less than 
the applicable volume set forth by Congress in § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(III), the 
EPA must lower the applicable value using the cellulosic waiver.63
If the EPA lowers the applicable volume of cellulosic biofuel, it then 
has the authority to reduce the applicable volumes of both advanced 
biofuel and total renewable fuel by the same or lesser amount.64 There is 
no requirement that the EPA reduce these quotas, nor does the statute 
mandate any factors the EPA must consider in its determination to lower 
or to maintain these amounts.65 Thus, the EPA thus enjoys broad discretion in 
whether, and under what circumstances, it reduces the advanced and total 
renewable fuel volumes under the cellulosic biofuel waiver provision.66
                                                                                                            
55. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, §§ 201–04.
56. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i).
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I)–(IV).
60. See id. § 7545(o)(7)(D)–(F).
61. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(C).
62. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Biomass-
Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,433–434 (Dec. 14, 2015).
66. See id. at 77,434.
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2. General Waiver
If the EPA finds that reduction of the advanced biofuel and total 
renewable fuel permitted under its cellulosic waiver authority is 
insufficient to address supply limitations, it can then use its general waiver 
authority to effectuate a further reduction—one beyond that allowed by 
the cellulosic waiver.67
Section 211(o)(7) of the Clean Air Act grants the EPA Administrator 
authority to waive, in whole or in part, the national renewable fuel 
requirements if one of two situations occurs. First, the EPA Administrator, 
in consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy, may lower 
or waive the statutory amount if the Administrator determines that 
implementation of the requirement would severely harm the economy or 
environment of a state, region, or the U.S.68 In addition, the EPA 
Administrator may waive or reduce the statutory requirements if there is 
an existing inadequate domestic supply.69 On the petition of a state, fuel 
provider, or at the Administrator’s own discretion (in consultation with the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy), the EPA Administrator may grant 
a waiver or reduction for a single year.70 The EPA may not waive the 
requirement for an individual state or supplier, but must instead adjust the 
total national requirement.71 Thus, in the event of a waiver, all suppliers’ 
quotas would be reduced by the same percentage.
The EPA must also approve or deny a waiver petition within ninety 
days of its receipt, after providing public notice and opportunity for 
comment.72 A granted waiver expires after one year, subject to extension 
by the EPA Administrator in consultation with the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and Energy.73
IV. EPA WAIVER OF THE 2014–2016 STANDARDS—THE CRUX OF THE 
PROBLEM
For the first time since Congress promulgated the RFS, the EPA 
utilized both the cellulosic and general waiver provisions to significantly 
reduce the statutory volumes for 2014–2016.74 While the EPA’s use of its 
                                                                                                            
67. Id.
68. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i).
69. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(ii).
70. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(C).
71. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A).
72. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(A)–(B).
73. Id. § 7545(o)(7)(C).
74. See generally Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 
and the Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,435 
(Dec. 14, 2015).
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cellulosic waiver came as no surprise, its use of its general waiver 
authority is one of the most controversial aspects of its Final Rule.75 The 
EPA argued that there is an “inadequate domestic supply” of renewable 
fuel for 2014–2016 to justify its substantial reduction of the statutory 
volumes; however, its broad interpretation of the statutory phrase 
inadequate domestic supply allowed it to consider a vast array of factors, 
including those which seemingly pertain to inadequate demand for—
rather than inadequate supply of—renewable fuel.76
A. Statutory Volumes Waived or Reduced by the EPA
The EPA, for the first time and upon its own motion, proposed to 
lower the 2014 overall RFS mandate from 18.15 billion gallons to 15.21
billion, and the advanced biofuel mandate from 3.75 billion gallons to 2.20 
billion.77 After evaluating the availability of qualifying renewable fuels 
and factors,78 that in some cases limit supplying those fuels to the vehicles 
that can consume them, the EPA proposed to reduce the volumes of 
advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel due to an “inadequate domestic 
supply of these fuels.”79
The EPA published in the Federal Register its final volumes for 
cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel (biodiesel), advanced biofuel, and 
total renewable fuel for 2014, 2015, and 2016, on December 14, 2015.80
In its Final Rule, the EPA raised the volumes of all fuel categories above 
those in the proposed rule; however, the finalized volumes remain far 
below the statutory levels.81 For 2014, where actual volumes supplied to 
the market were known, the final volumes do not differ significantly from 
those proposed. This resulted in final volumes nearly 2 billion gallons 
below the 2014 statutory requirement for total renewable fuels.82 For 2015, 
where it had more than nine months of data on actual production, the EPA 
75. Jonathan Coppess, Evaluating EPA’s Arguments for RFS Waiver Authority,
4 FARMDOC DAILY 7 (Jan. 16, 2014), farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/01/evaluating-
epa-arguments-RFS-waiver-authority.html [https://perma.cc/PYK2-NLSG].
76. See id.
77. 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,424 (stating the original 2014 volume mandates); U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA PROPOSES 2014 RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARDS, 2015
BIOMASS-BASED DIESEL VOLUME 2 (Nov. 2013), epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015
-08/documents/420f13048.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9SB-DP5N] (stating the proposed 
reduced 2014 volume mandates).
78. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,431. These considerations include both the limitations 
in production and import of biofuels and factors that constrain supplying available 
volumes specified.
79. Id. at 77,435.
80. See generally 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420.
81. Id. at 77,440.
82. Id.
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raised—but only slightly—the final volumes for nearly all of the fuel 
categories.83 The final 2015 amounts reflect both actual supply and an 
extrapolation from those amounts for the remaining months of the year, 
resulting in moderate growth from the 2014 volumes.84 Though growth 
occurred, the finalized 2015 volumes remained well below the 2015 
statutory requirements.
For 2016, the EPA substantially increased its final volumes for total 
renewable fuel, and slightly increased its volumes for the other fuel 
categories. While the final volume for total renewable fuel is still far below 
the statutory volume, the EPA’s adjustment reflects a significant increase 
from both the proposed and final 2015 volumes. The EPA notes that the 
increase between the 2016 and 2015 volumes is “as ambitious as can 
reasonably be justified”85 and reflects the EPA’s “best judgment”86 as to 
the domestic supply of renewable fuels.
B. Factors the EPA Considered when Reducing Statutory Volumes
First, the EPA utilized its cellulosic waiver to reduce the volumes of 
advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel to address the shortfall in actual 
produced cellulosic biofuel compared to statutory levels. The EPA then 
combined the cellulosic waiver with its general waiver to establish its final 
volume for total renewable fuel, effectively augmenting the cellulosic 
waiver with its finding of inadequate domestic supply of ethanol and 
advanced biofuels to meet statutory volumes. While the EPA made its 
determination by estimating the volumes of cellulosic, biodiesel, and 
advanced biofuels that might actually be available in late 2015 and 2016, 
it also considered the blendwall.87 Thus, it concluded that limitations on 
transportation fuel and constraints on the market’s ability to absorb more 
ethanol in the fuel blend constituted relevant factors in determining 
whether there is an “inadequate domestic supply” of renewable fuel.
The two major industries affected by the U.S. fuel market—biofuel 
and oil—have and continue to debate the definition of inadequate 
domestic supply, a phrase that arguably appears to leave room for much 
interpretation. To biofuel proponents, the phrase is clear: it is the volume 
                                                                                                            
83. Id. at 77,447–448.
84. Id. at 77,442.
85. Id. at 77,427.
86. Id. at 77,449.
87. Id. at 77,433. The ‘‘E10 blendwall’’ represents the volume of ethanol that can 
be consumed domestically if all gasoline contains 10% ethanol and there are no 
higher-level ethanol blends consumed such as E15 or E85.
2017] SUPPLY AND DEMAND, ONE AND THE SAME SINCE WHEN? 409
of renewable fuel that can be produced or imported.88 Further, ethanol is 
abundant at the moment due to falling feedstock (corn) prices and a record 
harvest, spurring production.89 Bob Dineen, the president of the 
Renewable Fuels Association and lobbyist for major ethanol producers, 
stated that “inadequate domestic supply of—and this is important—of 
renewable fuel . . . and we’re swimming in renewable fuel. Inadequate 
domestic supply is not the issue.”90
In stark contrast, the oil industry deems inadequate domestic supply 
to represent the volume of biofuel-blended gasoline that can be physically 
sold in the U.S.91 Oil proponents argue that the country lacks the consumer 
demand and physical infrastructure to sell gasoline blended with more than 
10% ethanol, for reasons that will be discussed below. The EPA appears 
sympathetic to this argument, providing in its final standards that the 
ethanol blendwall is an important reality.92 The EPA further reasons that 
constraints on distribution and consumption of ethanol-blended fuels 
equate to inadequate domestic supply that triggers its general waiver 
authority. It provides that “[an] adequacy of supply would logically be 
understood in terms of the parties who use the supply of renewable fuel” 
and should “involve consideration of factors different from those involved 
when considering adequacy of supply to obligated parties.”93 It concludes 
that the concept of supply should “encompass the full range of constraints 
that could result in an inadequate supply of renewable fuel to the ultimate 
consumers, including fuel infrastructure and other constraints” such as 
“factors affecting the ability to distribute, blend, dispense, and consume 
those renewable fuels in vehicles.”94
While the EPA and the oil industry claim that this interpretation is 
plausible, critics argue that, in the event that there is actually an inadequate 
domestic supply of renewable fuel, it is the result of oil companies’ 
decisions to short the market by not providing enough gasoline or diesel.95
As the final standards include the use of the EPA’s general waiver 
authority for the first time, the EPA’s interpretation of its administrative 
power will be at the heart of upcoming litigation. Disputes will arise 
pertaining to the legality of the EPA’s interpretation of inadequate 
88. Cezary Podkul, Analysis: Brewing U.S. Ethanol Legal Battle Hinges on
the Meaning of ‘Supply,’ REUTERS, Oct. 17, 2013, reuters.com/article/us-ethanol-
supply-analysis-idUSBRE99H02N20131018 [https://perma.cc/X428-U6PP].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 77,423.
93. Id. at 77,436.
94. Id. at 77,435.
95. Podkul, supra note 88.
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domestic supply, and the courts will be faced with determining the scope 
of the EPA’s administrative and interpretive authority.
V. EPA INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT
Agencies, like the EPA, operate pursuant to statutes that empower 
them to act in some sphere. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
governs the feasibility of final “agency action,” which is defined to include 
the whole or part of an agency rule or order.96 The EPA’s finalized 
standards for 2014–2016, and thus the interpretation of its general waiver 
authority, constitute final agency action. This subjects the EPA to the 
APA’s codified standards. The APA establishes a standard of review that 
courts are to employ when analyzing the legitimacy of agency action.97
In the present case, the issue is whether the EPA’s discharge of its 
authority—its broad interpretation of its general waiver authority to 
provide for consideration of the blendwall constraints—is reasonable. 
Such a question falls within the province of traditional arbitrary and 
capricious review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In reviewing the EPA’s 
interpretation, the task is to determine whether the agency rationally 
considered factors to define inadequate domestic supply.98
The APA sets the scope of review in § 706.99 Section 706(2) involves 
the scope of review for questions of law, which include claims as to the 
meaning of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.100 The APA 
provides that courts must set aside agency action that “is not in accordance 
with the law,” or that is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, short of statutory right.”101 The Supreme Court established the 
landmark two-step test for the judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretation in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.102 The 
first step requires determining whether the statutory language being 
interpreted is ambiguous, or whether the meaning of the provision is clear 
using traditional tools of statutory construction.103 If the meaning of the 
provision is clear, that is the end of the matter, and the court announces 
the clear meaning of the statute.104 If, however, the meaning of the 
                                                                                                            
96. See Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
98. See id. at 77,429.
99. WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 271 (4th ed. 2012).
100. Id.
101. § 706(2)(A), (C); FUNK & SEAMON, supra note 99, at 272.
102. See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
103. Id. at 842–43.
104. Id.
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provision is unclear, the court moves to the second step, which requires 
the court to determine whether the agency’s construction is based on a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.105 If the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable or permissible, the court upholds the agency’s interpretation, 
even if the court does not believe it is the best interpretation.106
In Chevron, the Supreme Court found the EPA’s broad definition of 
source to be a permissible construction of a statute seeking to promote 
reduction of air pollution.107 The EPA cited to its varied interpretation of 
source to demonstrate its consistent and flexible reading of the term over 
time.108 The Court found that the court of appeal’s inflexible reading and 
holding that the EPA had not interpreted the statute permissibly was a 
basic legal error.109
A. Chevron Step 1: Whether the Clean Air Act is Ambiguous with 
Respect to “Inadequate Domestic Supply”
The first step of Chevron requires the court to determine whether the 
statute under which the agency is acting is unambiguous or silent on the 
issue in question.110 The test is whether there is ambiguity with regard to 
the “precise question at issue.”111 Thus, the question here is whether 
Congress, when granting the EPA waiver authority in the case of 
inadequate domestic supply intended to allow for consideration of the 
blendwall constraints.
There are four versions of Chevron step one.112 Under “original” 
Chevron, the case would be decided in step one only if Congress has 
explicitly answered the exact question at issue in the case.113 Using 
“traditional tools” Chevron, the reviewing court employs all of the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation to find clear congressional 
intent.114 Operating under “plain meaning” Chevron, the court finds clear 
congressional intent using the plain meaning rule, which provides that if 
the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the 
statute in order to ascertain the statute’s meaning.115 Finally, under 
105. Id.
106. FUNK & SEAMON, supra note 99, at 275.
107. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
108. Id. at 856.
109. JACK M. BEERMANN, INSIDE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND 
WHY 128 (2011).
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
111. Id.
112. BEERMANN, supra note 109, at 130–31.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 130.
115. Id.
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“extraordinary cases” Chevron, the reviewing court finds clear 
congressional intent based on an examination of the history and political 
context of the particular issue, which it finds leads to only one possible 
congressional intent.116
This Comment applies the “traditional tools” version of Chevron step 
one to the EPA’s interpretation of inadequate domestic supply. Under this 
less deferential standard, courts are more likely to find congressional intent 
on a matter and are thus more likely to reverse the agency’s interpretation. 
This Comment attempts to ascertain Congress’s intent using tools 
including: language, structure, purpose, legislative history, and canons of 
construction.117 Additionally, since Chevron, judges have looked beyond 
legislative history to the common usage,118 dictionary definition,119 and 
technical meaning120 of contested statutory language, as well as to 
traditional canons of statutory interpretation.121 Courts have also 
interpreted enabling acts in light of other legislation, “particularly where 
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at 
hand.”122 Most strikingly, courts have also considered the economic and 
political magnitude of the agency action at issue.123
1. Statutory Text
Courts begin analysis of statutory construction by examining the 
written text and determining whether the particular provision is—in 
isolation—ambiguous.124 Courts generally assume that the words of a 
statute mean what an “ordinary” and “reasonable” person would 
understand them to mean.125 In regard to inadequate domestic supply, the 
term domestic unambiguously refers to the supply existing within U.S. 
borders, as domestic is understood to mean “of, relating to, or involving 
one’s own country.”126 In addition, various provisions of the RFS refer to 
the amount of renewable fuel in the U.S.127 While many terms in the 
116. Id. at 131.
117. Id. at 130.
118. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., WILLIAM S. JORDAN III & RICHARD W. MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 1071 (6th ed. 2010).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1068.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1070.
125. Id.
126. Domestic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009).
127. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7545.
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provisions are clear, there is sufficient lack of clarity concerning both 
inadequate and supply.
a. Supply
The EPA claims in its Final Rule that inadequate domestic supply is 
ambiguous.128 It then asserts that the common understanding of the term 
supply is “an amount of a resource or product that is available for use by the 
person or place at issue.”129 Adopting a broad definition, the EPA’s concept 
of supply encompasses not only what is produced, but also what is sold and 
subsequently used by consumers. Opponents of the reduced RFS mandates 
oppose the EPA’s broad reading, insisting instead that the EPA’s insertion 
of consumer demand into a supply analysis is illogical, and is thus an 
overreach of its constitutional authority. These opponents urge that supply,
in the context of the RFS, denotes the “volume of renewable fuel that can 
be produced or imported.”130 They effectively rely on language that confines 
the RFS compliance provisions to “ . . . refineries, blenders, distributors, and 
importers.”131 This list of “obligated parties” does not include end 
consumers.132 Further, this narrow definition precludes the EPA’s 
consideration of the blendwall constraints and limits its focus to the nation’s 
capacity to physically produce renewable fuel.
Legal sources define supply as “the amount of goods produced or 
available at a given price.”133 Under this definition, determination of the 
“amount . . . available to be purchased”134 necessarily includes consideration 
of factors affecting the ability to sell the product. In this case, in order for 
renewable fuel to be available for purchase, it would have to be made 
available to consumers at the pump. This would require acknowledgement 
of distribution constraints, as without infrastructure suitable for the housing 
and dispensing of higher ethanol-blended fuel, it is impossible for 
consumers to purchase it.
The EPA argues that the isolated statute appears ambiguous in 
reference to the inadequate supply of which product triggers the EPA’s 
general waiver authority. The EPA notes that it is unclear whether the 
“available renewable fuel” definition encompasses neat renewable fuel135
                                                                                                            
128. Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the Biomass-
Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,435 (Dec. 14, 2015).
129. Id.
130. Podkul, supra note 88.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Supply, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
134. Id.
135. Neat renewable fuel is a renewable fuel to which 1% or less of gasoline 
fuel has been added. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1401 (2016).
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or whether it also includes the renewable fuel blended with transportation 
fuel. If construed narrowly to apply only to neat renewable fuel, the EPA 
has no authority to consider blendwall and distribution constraints. 
Conversely, should a court determine that ambiguity lends itself in favor 
of EPA discretion, the fuel supply in question will encompass blended 
fuels and will ultimately permit the incorporation of the infrastructural 
constraints addressed in the EPA’s Final Rule.
In this regard, the EPA is mistaken. The inadequate domestic supply in 
question refers undoubtedly to renewable fuel—the antecedent for supply in 
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A)(ii) in the “renewable fuel required under paragraph 
(2),” which immediately precedes sections (i) and (ii).136 “Paragraph (2)” 
refers to § 7545(o)(2), which specifies the “applicable volume of renewable 
fuel.”137 As further explained infra, this clearly refers to the renewable fuel 
available for purchase by obligated parties, not finished fuels that contain a 
specified fraction of renewable fuels, which are distributed to end consumers. 
Subparagraph (o)(2)(A) directed the EPA to promulgate regulations to 
“ensure that transportation fuel sold or introduced into commerce in the 
United States . . . on an annual average basis, contains at least the applicable 
volume of renewable fuel . . . determined in accordance with subparagraph 
(B)[.]”138 Subparagraph B of paragraph (o)(2) contains tables that provide the 
statutory volume requirements for the four categories of renewable fuel: total 
renewable fuel, advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and biomass-based 
diesel.
b. Inadequate
Even if the court were to interpret supply narrowly to exclude the 
blendwall constraints, the EPA can and should argue that the term 
inadequate is also ambiguous. Depending on which dictionary you 
consult, inadequate is subject to a number of reasonable definitions.
Inadequate can be commonly defined as “inept or unsuitable.”139
Under this definition, inadequate supply would be construed to mean that 
the supply is unsuitable in relation to another factor. As demand and 
supply for a given source are intimately linked, an enormous supply in 
relation to a dwindling demand may deem a supply unsuitable for that 
demand. This definition lends itself in favor of the EPA’s interpretation, 
which provides:
136. See § 7545(o)(7)(A).
137. Id. § 7545(o)(2).
138. Id. § (o)(2)(A)(i).
139. Inadequate, DICTIONARY.COM, dictionary.reference.com/browse/inadequate 
[https://perma.cc/7YA7-PVX2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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Adequacy of the supply would logically be understood in terms of 
the parties who use the supply of renewable qualifying fuels. 
Adequacy of supply could affect various parties, including 
obligated parties, blenders, and consumers. Adequacy of the 
renewable fuel supply with respect to the consumer might well 
involve consideration of factors different from those involved 
when considering adequacy of the upstream supply of biofuels to 
the obligated parties.140
Opponents may argue that inadequate is defined as “not enough” or 
insufficient.141 If a court were to construe supply to indicate the amount 
produced, this definition would lend itself to an interpretation consistent 
with that of biofuel proponents. In this context, if the amount produced 
satisfies the statutory volumes, the EPA would have no authority to 
interpret its general waiver authority as it has in its Final Rule.
2. Other Factors to Consider
Though inadequate domestic supply appears ambiguous when read in 
isolation, a reviewing court employing a “statutory tools” Chevron step 
one analysis will consider materials beyond the specific text to determine 
the proper meaning of a statutory provision.142 In fact, reasonable statutory 
interpretation by an agency must account for both the specific context in 
which language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.143
Agency interpretation that is inconsistent with the design and structure of 
the statute as a whole does not merit deference.144 Further, Chevron itself 
considered not only the language of the statute, but also the legislative 
history and policy arguments regarding the provision in question.145
a. Legislative History and Congressional Intent
The legislative history is limited as to whether Congress intended 
inadequate domestic supply to encompass the blendwall constraints. 
However, it is likely that legal challenges to the 2014–2016 standard 
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reductions will shift focus on a two-word phrase removed from the 2005 
law that established the RFS. Congress declined to pass a bill providing 
for express consideration of “distribution capacity” in the general waiver 
provisions of the RFS.146 This refusal is significant as it raises questions 
regarding the reason Congress chose to exclude the language. There is no 
legislative history explaining why Congress enacted the language in lieu 
of the alternative formation. On one hand, Congress may have found the 
phrase “inadequate domestic supply” sufficiently broad to cover 
distribution capacity, thus striking the phrase as superfluous and 
unnecessary. Further, Congress may have deemed the language too 
narrow, as it suggested that constraints on delivering fuel to the ultimate 
consumer—other than “distribution capacity”—should not be considered 
for purposes of enacting a general waiver. Under these theories, Congress 
found “inadequate supply” sufficient to cover all aspects of supply, in 
terms of both production of and capacity to sell and consume it.
However, while not dispositive, legislative history “strongly militates 
against a judgment that Congress intended as a result that it expressly 
declined to act.”147 The Supreme Court has confirmed that “[w]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits 
it in another, it is presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely 
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”148 Under this presumption, and as 
noted by advocates of the biofuels industry, if Congress meant to include 
“capacity to supply” in addition to or as opposed to “supply,” it would 
have done so.
b. Neighboring Statutory Provisions
The remainder of the statutory scheme often clarifies a provision that 
seems ambiguous in isolation—only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.149
Further, there are many fuel-related provisions of the Clean Air Act with 
waiver provisions similar to that found in the RFS. The EPA claims that 
these statutes emphasize both the ambiguity of the RFS general waiver 
provision and the reasonableness of applying it broadly to include 
146. See, e.g., H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005) (citing to § 1501(a)(2)).
147. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); see also Doe 
v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 622–23 (2004) (Privacy Act does not authorize presumed
damages because “Congress cut out the very language in the bill that would have 
authorized any presumed damages.”).
148. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2013) (quoting Bates v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30 (1997)).
149. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (citing United Sav. Ass’n of 
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
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adequacy of supply to the ultimate consumer of transportation fuel.150
However, when looking at Congressional word choice, these statutes 
demonstrate that Congress intended for the EPA to consider distribution 
capacity in addition to supply, since it says so expressly.
i. Section 211(c)(4)(C)(ii)
Section 211(c)(4)(C)(ii) of the Clean Air Act provides the EPA with 
waiver authority to address “extreme and unusual fuel or fuel additive 
supply circumstances . . . which prevent the distribution of an adequate 
supply of fuel or fuel additive to consumers.”151 Here, Congress indicates 
that the adequacy of supply is related to the availability of fuel or fuel 
additive to the ultimate consumer. The statutory language expressly grants 
the EPA authority to consider distribution constraints.
Unlike § 211(c)(4)(C)(ii), the RFS general waiver provision does not 
contain such clarity. Though the EPA argues that the broad and ambiguous 
wording provides discretionary power to interpret the scope of its waiver 
authority as “relating to [the] supply of renewable fuel [in neat or blended 
form] to the ultimate consumer,”152 one must question why Congress 
deleted the statutory language from earlier bill drafts.
ii. Section 211(m)(3)(c)
Section 211(m)(3)(c) of the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to delay the 
effective date of oxygenated gasoline requirements for certain carbon 
monoxide nonattainment areas if it finds “inadequate domestic supply of, 
or distribution capacity for, oxygenated gasoline . . . or fuel additives” 
needed to make oxygenated gasoline.153 The linguistic choice hints that 
“inadequate domestic supply” should be read as more limited in scope, in 
particular to exclude consideration of distribution capacity.
The RFS uses inadequate domestic supply without the further 
clarification of § 211(m)(3)(c). On one hand, this may indicate that 
Congress provides the EPA discretion to determine the adequacy of the 
supply of renewable fuel in terms of availability for use by the ultimate 
consumer, including consideration of capacity to distribute the product to 
the ultimate consumer. More likely, however, Congress’s deliberate 
exclusion of “distribution capacity” from the RFS general waiver 
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151. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C)(ii)(I).
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provision strongly lends itself to a narrow interpretation of “inadequate 
domestic supply”—one that excludes distribution constraints.
3. Determining Whether “Inadequate Domestic Supply” is
Ambiguous under “Tools of Construction” Chevron Step One
A statute cannot be interpreted to grant power beyond its text unless it 
is done to effectuate the statute’s purpose.154 Congress promulgated the 
RFS to decrease American dependence on foreign oil sources and to 
combat rising global temperatures. This requires that an increased amount 
of renewable fuel be produced. Though the legislative history is scant, 
when analyzing the RFS provisions in concert with neighboring provisions 
of the Clean Air Act, it appears that Congress intentionally struck the 
language relating to distribution capacity because it did not intend for the 
EPA to consider it when waiving the RFS statutory levels. As such, the 
statutory language read in context of the Clean Air Act clearly prohibits 
the EPA from waiving or reducing statutory volumes to address 
distribution constraints.155 A court should find this statute to clearly refer 
to inadequate domestic supply in its narrowest sense.
B. Chevron Step Two: Determining Whether the EPA’s Interpretation is 
Reasonable
If a court finds inadequate domestic supply to be ambiguous, the EPA 
must then demonstrate that its interpretation of this phrase is rational. The 
Chevron Step Two analysis requires the court to determine whether the 
EPA’s construction is based on a reasonable or permissible interpretation 
of the statute.156
Chevron provides that an agency interpretation should be upheld 
unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.”157 In 
other words, a court must uphold agency action if there is a rational basis 
for it.158 While this determination appears simple at first blush, defining 
precisely what constitutes a reasonable or permissible construction of a 
statute, or what materials a court is required to consider in making that 
determination, is often difficult. Further, there is confusion over whether 
Chevron Step Two pertains to the reasonableness of an agency’s 
interpretation as a matter of the meaning of the statute’s language or is 
more about the reasonableness of the agency’s policy decision and 
154. KOCH, JORDAN & MURPHY, supra note 118, at 1076.
155. See supra Part V.A.2.b.
156. See supra Part V.A.2.b.
157. See supra Part V.A.2.b.
158. See supra Part V.A.2.b.
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judgment to adopt the particular meaning.159 Thus, the most important 
function of “arbitrary and capricious review” is its application to questions 
of judgment.160 The Supreme Court currently uses the “rational 
relationship test,”161 a highly deferential assessment that deems laws 
unconstitutional only if there is no possible rational basis to further a 
legitimate governmental interest.162
The leading application of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of 
review is found in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State 
Farm Mutual,163 which involved a challenge to a decision by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) to rescind a rule in 
which the agency had required every automaker to include, in every car 
marketed in the U.S. after a specified date, one of two safety devices—air 
bags or automatic seatbelts.164 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
decision holding the NHSTA’s action arbitrary and capricious, wrote what 
has become the standard paragraph describing “arbitrary and capricious 
review”:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relief on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.165
The Supreme Court has applied the State Farm test to several agency 
rulemakings. Taken together, these cases illustrate: (1) the Court remains 
committed to the test announced in State Farm—a decision is arbitrary 
and capricious unless an agency engaged in a reasoned decision-making 
process; (2) the State Farm test is extremely malleable; and (3) the 
question whether an agency engaged in a reasoned decision-making within 
the meaning of State Farm is often identical to the question courts consider 
under Chevron Step Two—whether an agency’s construction of an 
ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute is reasonable. 
Because these standards appear to be similarly construed, this Comment 
analyzes Chevron Step Two in light of the State Farm factors.
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1. Whether the EPA Considered Factors Congress Did Not Identify
The Supreme Court announced in State Farm: “[N]ormally, an agency 
rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress had not intended it to consider . . . .”166 This statement can 
be interpreted in two ways: (1) to prohibit an agency from considering a 
factor unless Congress specifically instructed it to do so; or (2) to prohibit 
an agency from considering a factor only if Congress specifically 
prohibited it from doing so. The second alternative should be adopted 
because Congress’s plain intent is to allow an agency to attempt to further 
a list of societal goals that is far too long to incorporate into any statute.167
Further, a key prong of arbitrariness review is an examination of the 
number and nature of “relevant factors” considered by an agency in 
reaching its policy decision.168 There are two contexts in which this 
analysis takes place. The first occurs when the relevant factors are 
provided by statute, and requires the reviewing court to ask whether the 
factors actually relied upon by the agency comport with those in the 
statute.169 The second involves congressional silence regarding the 
relevant factors and asks whether an agency’s own choices regarding 
which factors to consider satisfy the review.170
The present case involves the second scenario, as Congress appears 
silent with regard to what factors the EPA is to consider when determining 
whether to apply its waiver authority. However, though Congress is silent 
with regard to the waiver provision itself, examination of congressional 
intent behind EISA and other RFS statutes sheds some light on the issue. 
It demonstrates that Congress’s active choice to excise particular language 
from the general waiver provision demonstrates intent to limit the factors 
the EPA can consider when exercising its waiver authority. Further, it 
appears that the EPA stepped beyond the bounds of its authority by 
considering factors Congress has implicitly prohibited.
The EPA notes a number of factors it considered when formulating 
the final volumes for 2014–2016. These include, but are not limited to: 
limitations on supply of cellulosic biofuel; insufficient supply of other 
advanced biofuel to offset the shortfall in cellulosic biofuel; and practical 
and legal constraints on the ability of the market to supply renewable fuels 
166. Id.
167. J. MASRHAW & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 214–15 
(1990).
168. Louis J. Virelli III, Destructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C.
L. REV. 721, 753 (2014).
169. Id. at 754.
170. Id. at 754–55.
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to the vehicles that can use them.171 While the first two factors clearly 
implicate the supply of renewable fuels, the third factor appears to blur the 
line between supply and distribution of supply. Congress does not 
specifically enumerate factors that the EPA must consider when 
determining whether there is a supply inadequate enough to trigger the 
EPA’s waiver authority; however, reading this provision in light of 
neighboring statutes and EISA language lends to a narrower interpretation 
of both supply and to the appropriate factors to use when determining 
whether such supply is adequate.
Further, the RFS provides that the promulgated regulations for renewable 
fuels, as well as the obligation itself, apply to “refineries, blenders, 
distributors, and importers, as appropriate.”172 When defining the obligated 
parties, Congress does not mention consumers. Again, an active exclusion of 
the word “consumers” from the obligated party definition evidences 
congressional intent to limit the application of the RFS to those responsible 
for producing the renewable fuel, not to expand it to consumer use.
2. Whether the EPA Failed to Consider an Important Aspect of the 
Problem
The EPA’s reduction of the statutory volumes will undermine 
certainty and predictability for investors and other biofuel market 
participants.173 This will undoubtedly lead to negative environmental and 
economic consequences that run contrary to Congress’s legislative 
purposes in enacting the statute.174
The underlying reality is that market pressures drive innovation; 
however, there is no way markets can assess the value of avoiding 
“catastrophic climate change, or for the benefit of disentangling 
[themselves] from the geopolitical and national security concerns that 
come along with serious dependence on the oil market.”175 Though the 
goals of decreasing dependence on the oil market are worth pursuing, the 
                                                                                                            
171. See Final Renewable Fuel Standards for 2014, 2015 and 2016 and the 
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,426 (Dec. 14, 
2015).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
173. Jim Lane, Industry’s Withering Critique of EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard 
Proposals for 2014, 2015, 2016: The Digested Version, BIOFUELS DIGEST (July 19, 
2015), biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2015/07/29/industrys-withering-critique-of-epas-
renewable-fuel-standard-proposals-for-2014-2015-2016-the-digested-version/ [https:
//perma.cc/V63R-S8DL].
174. Id.
175. Jeff Spross, Why the EPA Cut Down the Biofuel Standard for the First Time 
Ever, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 18, 2013, 12:26 PM), thinkprogress.org/climate/2013
/11/18/2956771/epa-cut-biofuel-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/8H7C-7GEA].
422 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. V
market will not achieve them if left to its own devices. Oil refiners, car 
companies, and station supply chains have no inherent motivation to see 
how far they can push the technology for higher blends. Moreover, like all 
businesses, refiners, car companies, and supply chains are hesitant to take 
on the added costs and risks of accommodating higher renewable fuel 
blends without concrete incentive.176 For this reason, the pressure to drive 
this necessary innovation must come from the government. This means 
that the RFS must be implemented in its intended form.
Bob Dinneen claimed “the minute you introduce blending capacity or 
blendwall considerations into a decision as to whether or not to waive the 
problem is the minute you take the nation’s renewable fuel policy away 
from the statute and put it in the hands of oil companies.”177
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the American 
Automobile Manufacturers insist that the EPA is pushing E15 too hard and 
too quickly.178 Service stations also struggle with the costs and practical 
challenges of updating their equipment to take E15 blends and higher.179
While this is the practical reality, oil companies are to blame. These 
companies structure their contracts with service stations to hold down the 
sale of higher blends, and to prevent advertising. If the oil companies were 
so concerned with surplus ethanol, they would make it much easier for 
service stations to sell higher blends.180 Most importantly, this would 
involve the willingness to implement the infrastructure designed to blend, 
distribute, and dispense renewable fuels.
It is not that the EPA failed to consider the impact of its statutory 
reduction on American innovators; it is that it failed to consider the 
magnitude of that impact. By giving in to notions of the blendwall, the 
EPA is effectively handing the future of the biofuels industry to the oil 
companies.
3. Whether the EPA Offered an Explanation for its Decision that
Runs Counter to the Evidence Before It
This element, known as the “rational connection” factor, serves as an 
important check on potentially irrational administrative conduct that goes 
to the very heart of the justifications of the administrative state. Its 
deferential approach fosters agency expertise and efficiency, while at the 
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same time guarding against administration that is so irrational as to betray 
its democratic pedigree.181
In agency decisions involving scientific or technical information, an 
issue arises as to whether an agency had processes to ensure the reliability 
or veracity of information inputs to its policy decisions.182 Reliable inputs 
provide substantive information relevant to policymakers and create a 
rational basis from which administrators may justify their policy 
determinations.183 The process for exclusion of unreliable information is 
even more important, as unreliable information could cause agencies to 
make poorly informed decisions, “manufacture uncertainty,” or otherwise 
mischaracterize those inputs in support of a policy decision that is not in 
fact supported by data.184
It appears that the EPA has placed too much reliance on the 
distribution problems professed by retailers. The oil industry has declared 
that there is no role for any ethanol beyond E10, or for the RFS at all.185
However, they clearly have a vested interest in distracting the legislature 
from looking at E85, and will stop at nothing to keep the debate focused 
on the limitations of E10. The corn ethanol lobby would like to pretend 
that the infrastructural constraints are not real, and have been entirely 
manufactured by the oil industry. While the infrastructural challenges of 
the blendwall are real, they are more like speed bumps, which require 
slowing down—not stopping.
4. Whether the EPA’s Interpretation is So Implausible that it Could 
Not Be Ascribed to a Difference in View of the Product of Agency 
Expertise
Although the EPA’s Acting Assistant Administrator of the Office of 
Air and Radiation provided that the lowered standards established a “path 
for ambitious, responsible growth in biofuels,” the EPA’s decision to 
lower the 2014–2016 statutory levels set by Congress is neither ambitious 
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nor responsible.186 It makes little sense that in promulgating a mandate for 
the commercialization of biofuels, which implies a mandate that they be 
consumed, Congress intended to grant the EPA authority to waive that 
mandate in light of consumption constraints. In fact, these constraints were 
likely part of the original impetus for the mandate. It seems much more 
plausible that Congress intended for its mandate to be waived in the event 
that there is sufficient production of domestic biofuels to satisfy it.187 In 
the end, the RFS program was designed to force the oil industry to change 
the statute quo, not to perpetuate it. The entire purpose of the program 
would be subverted if the oil industry is rewarded for its failure to take the 
steps necessary to ensure that it is capable of distributing, blending, and 
dispensing the renewable fuel volumes required by the statute.188
CONCLUSION
While courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes that they 
are charged with implementing, this deference is not without limits.189 The
EPA’s proffered interpretation is not consistent with the text, structure, or 
purposes of the statute, and is unreasonable.190 Moreover, the EPA’s 
interpretation is directed in significant part to accommodating the 
economic interests of parties who are obligated to comply with the 
statutory renewable volume obligations, which is not a permissible basis 
for waiving or ignoring the requirements of the statute.191 With all due 
respect to the EPA, the Agency’s proposed interpretation of “inadequate 
domestic supply” amounts to a rhetorical sleight of hand.192 Supply is not 
demand. The EPA appears to have acted contrary to congressional intent 
by considering blendwall constraints to trigger its general waiver 
authority. However, even if a court were to construe the statutory language 
broadly to find it ambiguous and give the EPA discretion to consider the 
blendwall factors, the EPA’s decision will not satisfy the four-factor test 
set forth in State Farm, or the Chevron’s Step Two. Not only does the EPA 
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appear to consider factors expressly unintended by Congress, as evidenced 
by the excision of language pertaining to “distribution capacity,” it also fails 
to consider a serious and evident impact of the statutory reduction. By 
adopting the oil companies’ narratives regarding the ability of the market to 
effectively distribute increasing volumes of renewable fuels, rather than 
putting the RFS back on track, the EPA has created its own slower, costlier, 
and ultimately diminished track for renewable fuels in the U.S.
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